

Sentencing Exhibit 2

Expert Report of
Evan Kohlmann

Expert Report:
United States v. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Pirouz
Sedaghaty, and Soliman Hamad al-Buthe

My full name is Evan Francois Kohlmann. I am a private International Terrorism Consultant who specializes in tracking Al-Qaida and other contemporary terrorist movements. I hold a degree in International Politics from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Georgetown University), and a Juris Doctor (professional law degree) from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am also the recipient of a certificate in Islamic studies from the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU) at Georgetown University. I currently work as an investigator with the NEFA Foundation and as an on-air analyst for NBC News in the United States. I also run an Internet website Globalterroralert.com that provides information to the general public relating to international terrorism. I am author of the book Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe: the Afghan-Bosnian Network (Berg/Oxford International Press, London, 2004) which has been used as a teaching text in graduate-level terrorism courses offered at such educational institutions as Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Princeton University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

As part of my research beginning in approximately 1997, I have traveled overseas to interview known terrorist recruiters and organizers (such as Abu Hamza al-Masri) and to attend underground conferences and rallies; I have reviewed thousands of open source documents; and, I have amassed one of the largest digital collections of terrorist multimedia and propaganda in the world. The open source documents in my collection include sworn legal affidavits, original court exhibits, video and audio recordings, text communiqués, eyewitness testimonies, and archived Internet websites. I have testified on ten occasions as an expert witness in jurisdictions beyond the United States—including the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have testified once as an expert witness in a U.S. civil case, Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. I have additionally testified as an approved expert witness in United States federal and military courts in fifteen criminal cases; including:

- United States v. Sabri Benkhala (Eastern District of Virginia, 2004)
- United States v. Ali Timimi (Eastern District of Virginia, 2005)
- United States v. Uzair Paracha (Southern District of New York, 2005)
- United States v. Ali Asad Chandia (Eastern District of Virginia, 2006)
- United States v. Yassin Aref (Northern District of New York, 2006)
- United States v. Sabri Benkhala (Eastern District of Virginia, 2007)
- United States v. Rafiq Sabir (Southern District of New York, 2007)
- United States v. Emadeddine Muntasser (District of Massachusetts, 2007)
- United States v. Hassan Abu Jihaad (District of Connecticut, 2008)
- United States v. Mohammed Amawi et al. (Northern District of Ohio, 2008)
- United States v. Salim Hamdan (Guantanamo Bay Military Commissions, 2008)

- United States v. Ali Hamza al-Bahlul (Guantanamo Bay Military Commissions, 2008)
- United States v. Mohamed Shnewer et al. (District of New Jersey, 2008)
- United States v. Oussama Kassir (Southern District of New York, 2009)
- United States v. Syed Haris Ahmed (Northern District of Georgia, 2009)
- United States v. Ehsanul Sadequee (Northern District of Georgia, 2009)

In United States v. Uzair Paracha, Federal District Judge Sidney Stein held a Daubert hearing on my qualifications as an expert witness and issued a ruling concluding: “Evan Kohlmann has sufficient education, training, and knowledge to be qualified as an expert, and... Kohlmann’s methodology—that is, his process of gathering sources, including a variety of original and secondary sources, cross-checking sources against each other, and subjecting his opinions and conclusions to peer review—is sufficiently reliable to meet the standards for admissibility of expert testimony set by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”

Likewise, in United States v. Hassan Abu Jihaad, Federal District Judge Mark Kravitz held a Daubert hearing on my qualifications as an expert witness and issued a ruling concluding, “Mr. Kohlmann is certainly qualified to provide expert testimony... Mr. Kohlmann is qualified by means of his education, training, background, and experience to testify as an expert on terrorism... Mr. Kohlmann has conducted first-hand interviews of several leaders of terrorist organizations and has reviewed reams of information about al Qaeda... and the other subjects on which he will offer testimony. Indeed... it is apparent that these subjects are Mr. Kohlmann’s life work, and he has, therefore, acquired a considerable amount of information and documentation on these subjects... Mr. Kohlmann’s work receives a considerable amount of peer review from academic scholars and others, and by all accounts, Mr. Kohlmann’s work is well regarded.”

Similarly, during United States v. Syed Haris Ahmed, Federal District Judge William S. Duffey Jr. held a Daubert hearing on my qualifications as an expert witness, and noted in his published ruling, “Kohlmann has developed an understanding of terrorist organization structures, operations, and membership, allowing him to speak with authority about Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. His research and experience have provided him a base of understanding far greater, and far more sophisticated, than of the Court or of jurors... A person lacking Kohlmann’s advanced knowledge of JeM and LeT essentially would not be able to recognize the information on Khan’s hard drive as information that might link a person to JeM or LeT.”

I.) Research and Archival Methodology

The methodology employed in formulating this report is derived from techniques taught to me by the late Dr. Joseph Leggold, a senior faculty member from the Department of Government of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown University, as part of official coursework towards the completion of my Georgetown University Senior Honors Thesis, “The Legacy of the Arab-Afghans: A Case Study.” Sources of research in the field of terrorism and terrorist organizations can loosely be divided into three sub-categories: primary sources, secondary sources, and

tertiary sources. Primary sources are generally considered to be the most credible and most authentic sources of information for objective analysis. Examples of primary sources would be a face-to-face interview with the leader of a terrorist organization, an in-person visit to a training camp, or directly witnessing a terrorist attack. However, because international terrorist organizations are, by their very nature, secretive organizations which operate clandestinely, access to primary sources is rare and inconsistent. As such, frequently, terrorism analysts must instead turn to secondary sources in order to gain a deeper understanding of these groups. Examples of secondary sources would be an original video or audio recording of a terrorist leader, published written communiqués, or an official magazine/website created by a terrorist organization. Secondary sources can occasionally be self-authenticating (i.e. a high-resolution video of an unmasked individual speaking) or can require deductive reasoning in order to determine their authenticity. Beyond primary and secondary sources, there is one further category of research: tertiary sources. Examples of tertiary sources would be a newspaper article, a television news report, or a book or magazine published by a reputable third party. However, the information offered in tertiary sources often comes through a convoluted or unclear chain of custody, and thus I limit my own use of tertiary sources to add additional context to information already confirmed by primary or secondary sources.

In order to determine the provenance of particular secondary or tertiary sources, I engage in a traditional social science method known as “comparative analysis.” This requires me to compare and contrast particular sources in question with other analogous sources contained in my digital archive, searching for common threads and themes. By drawing from a wide assortment of primary and secondary sources, I establish a single, objective narrative—while simultaneously noting any significant factual discrepancies or conflicting data. During a May 2009 Daubert hearing before Judge William S. Duffey Jr. in the Northern District of Georgia, I explained the process of “comparative analysis” and how I rely upon it when making determinations of fact. This testimony was subsequently summarized by Judge Duffey in his own published ruling qualifying me as an expert:

“The basis for Kohlmann’s testimony, generally, is his years of research and tracking of terrorist information, through websites, primary interviews, books, news articles, and journals, and other information. His testimony essentially synthesizes these concepts, and through the use of the comparative analysis methodology, Kohlmann has developed an understanding of terrorist organization structures, operations, and membership... Kohlmann testified in detail regarding the methodology of comparative analysis, how it is relied upon by experts in social sciences, and how the particular information he gathers allows him to perform reliable analysis. He specifically testified to how he gathers and analyses information from primary, secondary, and tertiary sources, and he explained the difference between the sources and why and how he relies on each differently. He further explained how comparative analysis is performed, assimilating the relevant information and comparing and contrasting sources against one another to form a cohesive whole. The sources Kohlmann uses and the methodology he employs to analyze those sources, are identical to those used by other experts in his field. Kohlmann explained his methodology and how he used the methodology to arrive at his opinions in this case. The defendants did not offer any evidence at the hearing or subsequent to it to suggest that Kohlmann’s methodology is not sound or is not the same methodology typically relied

upon by other social scientists... Mr. Kohlmann's ability to synthesize that information through comparative analysis establishes his qualification as an expert."

In July 2009, I was requested by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon to prepare an expert report on the following subjects:

- The Islamic Army of the Caucasus (a/k/a "The Chechen Mujahideen", "The Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade", "Group Khattab", "The Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus", "The Ansar Brigade").
- The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (a/k/a "The Al-Harameyn Foundation", "Al-Haramain al-Sharifayn", "Foundation of the Two Holy Shrines").
- The relationship, if any, between the Islamic Army of the Caucasus and the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation.
- The websites of the Islamic Army of the Caucasus: Kavkazcenter.com, Qoqaz.com, and Qoqaz.net.
- The American Islamic Group (AIG).

II.) The Islamic Army of the Caucasus

The Islamic Army of the Caucasus is arguably the premiere armed insurgent organization active in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and other surrounding regions. The roots of this movement can be traced to events that occurred near the end of the first Russo-Chechen war of the 1990s. Seeking independence from Russia, in 1991, a former Soviet air force officer Dzokhar Dudayev took the lead as the President of a new autonomous republic. However, the Russian government refused to recognize Dudayev's government, fearing the spread of similar secessionist sentiments across its southern frontier. For three years, between 1991 and 1994, the Russians held back on the use of force as relations between Dudayev and the Moscow government of President Boris Yeltsin continued to deteriorate. Finally, in December 1994, the Russian military launched a major operation into Chechnya in hopes of removing the Dudayev government and quelling Chechen dreams of self-sovereignty. The two years of conflict that followed were bloody and devastating, pitting poorly armed but determined Chechen resistance fighters against the full might of the Russian military. Nonetheless, even after the infamous "Battle of Grozny" in the winter of 1994-1995 and the fall of the capital, the Chechen insurgency continued on.

The Russian military failed to subdue Chechnya, but its relentless assault had devastated the first generation of independent Chechen leadership. In the meantime, new men began to fill the void left by the fallen nationalists like Dudayev—particularly those with links to religious extremists both at home and abroad. In the spring of 1995, in the latter stages of the first war with the Russians, a small expedition of foreign fighters arrived in Chechnya from Afghanistan led by Saudi Arabian national Ibn-ul-Khattab

(a.k.a. Samir Saleh ibn Abdullah al-Suwailem).¹ During a later recorded interview, Khattab recounted, "I was born in the northern Arabian Peninsula. I finished my secondary education and was about to continue my studies in the United States."² Yet, in 1987 at the age of 17, rather than travel to America, Khattab left his home in Saudi Arabia in a bid to join the jihad in Afghanistan. A mujahideen propaganda video produced about the life of Khattab noted, "in the hills of Afghanistan, Khattab's personality was refined and his fighting and leadership skills matured. He completed his initial training in a short period which amazed his trainers due to his rapid responses and learning of the various fighting disciplines... Within six years, the lion cub was transformed into an outstanding fighter and one of the bravest and most adroit leaders among the Mujahideen."³ Khattab reportedly participated in many celebrated battles that took place in the twilight of the Soviet-Afghan war, including the conquest of the cities of Jalalabad, Khost, and Kabul."⁴ His brother Omar has boasted, "When Jalalabad was conquered... one of the Afghan leaders entered an intelligence center, and he said: 'All of the reports that I saw were about Khattab and what he did and what he said, everyday Khattab done this and done that, he executed operations like this and that.' All of the reports were full of Khattab's name... most of the intelligence investigations were concerning Khattab."⁵

Yet, it was not enough for Khattab to merely win glory on the battlefield in Afghanistan. Leading an expeditionary group of other Arab-Afghans on a transnational safari of Muslim conflicts, Khattab traveled on from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, then Pakistan, and eventually the Caucasus in the southernmost reaches of the former Soviet Union in mid-1995. According to Khattab, "The events of Chechnya started and to be honest for us, these events were led by a former Soviet General Jawhar Dudayev, that was our perception about it... So initially, you could not look at it from an Islamic perspective. Anyway, after we studied the situation, we arranged an itinerary to visit the region for one or two weeks. We started to search for Chechnya on the map. It was actually a small republic... difficult to see on the map. Then, we entered the land of Chechnya accompanied with a group of just 12 brothers. By Allah, I was not anticipating anything from entering Chechnya except to train brothers. I even did not think that we could contribute anything to Chechnya."⁶ To aid him in his mission, Khattab brought eight other Arab mujahideen commanders with him from Afghanistan, including Yaqub al-Ghamidi (and his deputy Abu Waled al-Ghamidi), Abu Jafar al-Yemeni, Hakim al-

¹ "World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev." Azzam Publications. February 21, 2000. <http://www.qoqaz.net>.

² "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

³ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁴ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁵ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁶ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

Madani, and Abu Bakr Aqeedah.⁷ These men represented some of the cream of those who had trained in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and other “enemies” of Islam.

Abu Bakr Aqeedah, one of those who accompanied Khattab to the Caucasus, was an Egyptian national who was finally killed during a suicidal attack on a Russian Army base in Dagestan, in December 1997. While attending Engineering School in Egypt, Abu Bakr “became interested in working for Islam and met the likes of Dr. Sheikh Omar Abdur-Rahman, under whom he studied Islam for approximately two years.”⁸ Abu Bakr was also a frequent visitor to jihad training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, both as a student and an instructor: “hundreds upon hundreds of Mujahideen received training under him.”⁹ This legacy only continued on during his combat tour of the Caucasus: “Even though Abu Bakr was known and regarded by the Mujahideen as one of the most knowledgeable and experienced commanders in the world, his skills and expertise did not leave with him. In addition to the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, Abu Bakr also completed a thesis on ‘Operational Tactics and their Effectiveness’ based on all the military operations undertaken by the foreign Mujahideen in Chechnya, a few weeks before he was killed. All his writings now circulate amongst Mujahideen commanders all over the world.”¹⁰

In Chechnya and surrounding regions, Khattab also found a small but fierce group of locally-based indigenous militants willing to establish a partnership of mutual benefit. Khattab has explained, “When I saw groups of Chechens wearing headbands [There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger] written on them, and shouting [Allahu-Akbar], I decided that there was a Jihad going on in Chechnya.”¹¹ He described his admiration for the group of native Chechens and Dagestani Islamists he encountered: “They understood their religion and they read Quran, good young men. I also met other groups which were indeed of a very high standard... I was afraid that if we left, these young men might lose their enthusiasm, so we stayed with them.”¹² Khattab added:

“Our presence was... affirming an Islamic identity for the Chechen issue, because this case is not just a Chechen matter, but an Islamic matter—like what occurred in the case of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. You find in this land the Arab Mujahideen, Turks, and Mujahideen from everywhere. There is no doubt that despite the small numbers of the foreign brothers—which is because of several reasons, like the difficulties in reaching this area and the Russian siege around Chechnya—despite their numbers, their presence had a good and very strong effect on the people here and gave this issue an Islamic identity, affirming that this is indeed a jihad matter... for the establishment of an Islamic state.”¹³

⁷ “World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev.” Azzam Publications. February 21, 2000. <http://www.qoqaz.net>.

⁸ <http://www.azzam.com/html/storiesabubakraqeedah.htm>. November 2001.

⁹ <http://www.azzam.com/html/storiesabubakraqeedah.htm>. November 2001.

¹⁰ <http://www.azzam.com/html/storiesabubakraqeedah.htm>. November 2001.

¹¹ “Profile: Ibn-ul-Khattab, Commander of the Foreign Mujahideen in the Caucasus.” Azzam Publications. <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/chechnyaprofkhattab.htm>


¹² “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

¹³ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

As the firefights of the first Russo-Chechen conflict came to a close, Khattab and his men turned to their next mission of building a permanent base of support and coordination for themselves inside the Caucasus. Similar to what had occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other analogous conflict zones, foreign mujahideen commanders took local wives and “became their kin. So we established these strong relationships.”¹⁴ This phase of political development, which lasted from approximately 1996 to 1999, has since been described by the mujahideen as a period of “Preparation, Dawah, and Relief work.”¹⁵ In a recorded interview, Khattab later recounted:

“After the events of the first war in Chechnya... we began to organize everything, we prepared the camps, and we started to teach and train the people. We established an Islamic educational institute and our relations extended to hundreds of young men... We began to accept up to 400 young men per course. They came from throughout the Caucasus region: from Ingush, Kabardin, Karachay, Dagestan, Uzbekistan, Tataristan, and from everywhere! And this caused huge concerns for the Russians. The young began to attend these courses, Islamic learning and military training. It was like a beehive... All the brothers, mashallah, participated and everyone had a role, a job, and gave their efforts.”¹⁶

The institute established by Khattab and his colleagues was known as the “Kavkaz Institute” (a/k/a “the Caucasus Institute”, “the Kavkaz Foundation”, “the Kavkaz Institute for Dawah”). According to Khattab, “The most important thing is the Institute and dawah; more important than camps and more important than even military intelligence... Many wonderful individuals were trained here at the Kavkaz Institute for Dawah, as they studied the word of Allah and understood through reading the Quran and Hadith, comprehending the meaning of jihad. After the training they received at the camp, their energies exploded out into the world, and made them into leading symbols of the fight against the Russians.”¹⁷ Those who received “training” at the Kavkaz Institute included not only Chechens and those native to the Caucasus, but also other foreign fighters seeking instruction in the methodology of jihad—including “Masood al-Benin” (a/k/a “Xavier Jaffo”), a French national and close family friend of Zacarias Moussaoui—who pled guilty in United States District Court in Alexandria, Virginia to conspiring to kill Americans as part of the September 11, 2001 suicide hijackings.¹⁸ Zacarias’ brother



¹⁴ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

¹⁵ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

¹⁶ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

¹⁷ Voice of the Caucasus (Sawt al-Qoqaz). “Abu Umar al-Saif: The Mujahid Scholar.” <http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=36408>. November 27, 2008.

¹⁸ Boulden, Jim. “France opened Moussaoui file in ‘94.” *CNN*. December 11, 2001.

Abd-Samad later admitted to the CBC that Jaffo "was like a brother to me, but more dramatic than my brother."¹⁹ While in fighting in Chechnya in 1999-2000, Jaffo received "extensive training in the Mujahideen Kavkaz Institute for Training. Typically, he excelled in all he did. During advanced warfare courses he distinguished himself for his intelligence... He mastered the operations of computers as applied to a Video editing studio... Masood was assigned a role in the... camp which involved the use of his IT skills to setup and maintain a computer lab and to teach IT skills to the brothers."²⁰

Official documents marked with the logo of the Kavkaz Institute and signed by Khattab himself have been featured as still exhibits in mujahideen propaganda videos.²¹ Those documents, written primarily in Arabic, identify in detail the "administrative hierarchy" of the Institute:

"Supervisor: Shaykh Abu Umar al-Saif
 Manager: Abu Khalid al-Liby
 Liaison: Abu Rabi'a
 Administration and Instructors: Abu Abdelrahman al-Fayruzi, Abu Musab al-Tabuki, Abu Hamza al-Jazairi, Abu Asim al-Tabuki, Abu al-Ansar, Said al-Yemeni"
 Secretary of Living and Supplies: Abu Saad al-Maghribi."²²



Kavkaz Institute instructor and Saudi Arabian national Abu Musab al-Tabuki, killed while fighting in Dagestan in August 1999.

The supervisor of the Kavkaz Institute identified above, Abu Umar al-Saif (a/k/a "Mohammad Bin Abdullah al-Saif al-Jaber al-Buaynayn al-Tamimi"), was a native of the conservative town of Buraydah in northern Saudi Arabia. Prior to leaving his homeland in search of the mujahideen, Abu Umar studied Islamic law under senior clerics in Saudi Arabia, particularly Shaykh Mohammed bin Uthaimen. The jihadi magazine Nida ul-Islam, among others, has sought to address the controversy over the notion of an Islamic cleric taking up arms in a violent struggle. In a profile published in late 1997, magazine editors admonished, "while most of these people (including some knowledgeable people) were sitting down criticising, some actually went to Chechnya to do something about it. The Muslim Ummah is not short of scholars but it is short of scholars who are willing to take their knowledge to the Land of Jihad rather than sit back and criticise."²³ The profile offered an early look at Abu Umar and his key leadership role alongside his fellow Saudi comrade Khattab:

"Sheikh Abu Umar came to Chechnya in 1995 and joined the ranks of the Mujahideen there under the leadership of Ibn-ul-Khattab... also from the Arabian Gulf. He

¹⁹ Interview by Terence McKenna with Abd-Samad Moussaoui. Excerpted from "The Recruiters." Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC). June 2002.

²⁰ Azzam Publications. "Masood Al-Benin; Qoqaz.net Correspondent. Martyred 12 April 2000." <http://www.azzam.com/html/storiesmasoodalbenin.htm>.

²¹ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

²² "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

²³ "Global Muslim News - December 1997: Chechnya." Nida ul-Islam (Australia). Issue 21; December-January 1997-1998. <http://islam.org.au/www.islam.org.au/articles/21/news.htm>.

underwent training and at the same time, set about teaching Islam with the correct Aqeedah to the Chechen Mujahideen, many of whom held incorrect and distorted beliefs about Islam. Soon after the semi-permanent cease-fire deal in the Autumn of 1996, Sheikh Abu Umar, together with the help of a small group of brothers, set about building the structure of implementing Islamic law on the basis of the correct Aqeedah... Abu Umar has direct telephone contact with some of the notable scholars in the Arabian Gulf whom he can consult if he does not know anything.”²⁴

Video footage of mujahideen leadership conferences, interviews, and fatwahs (religious edicts) issued by Abu Umar al-Saif offer a multi-dimensional perspective into his strategy for building a fundamentalist Islamic state in the Caucasus in the shadow of Ibn-ul-Khattab. At one Shura Council meeting from 1999 featured in mujahideen propaganda videos, Abu Umar was shown sitting alongside Khattab as the latter declared, “It is imperative that we take prisoners [from the Russians] by any means. By Allah, these Russians are not only pigs, taking Mujahideen (as) prisoners, they are even taking our women.”²⁵ Approvingly, Abu Umar seconded, “The Russian government seeks to eliminate the mujahideen—killing, capturing, and pursuing them everywhere.”²⁶ In a separate online interview published in January 2000, Abu Umar boasted, “the Mujahideen have scored continuous victories against the enemy. This success can be attributed to the change in tactics from head-on defence to offensive hit-and-run tactics. This strategy has cost the enemy dearly.”²⁷ He added, “Islamic issues can only be solved by Islamic means, namely through abiding by Sharia (Divine Law) and not Western proposals or United Nations conditions... The jihad in Chechnya should serve as an example to all Muslims throughout the world that any Muslim rights that are forcibly usurped, including land, cannot be restored except through force. Negotiations only serve to lose one’s rights and honour.”²⁸ More recently, Abu Umar has directed several messages aimed at jihadi movements fighting in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. During one such recorded sermon in late 2003, he “recommend[ed] to the Mujahideen that instead of engaging in clashes and warfare against the Saudi government, it is better to go to Iraq. There, there are weapons aplenty and there they can fight the Americans. It is no secret that great damage will be caused the Americans if the Mujahideen turn to Iraq to fight them.”²⁹

Despite the poverty and suffering of the Chechen people, pet projects run by Abu Umar were surprisingly well-equipped and financed. For example, “Islamic courts” established by Abu Umar were each “equipped with its own office, vehicle etc...

²⁴ “Global Muslim News - December 1997: Chechnya.” Nida ul-Islam (Australia). Issue 21; December-January 1997-1998. <http://islam.org.au/www.islam.org.au/articles/21/news.htm>.

²⁵ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

²⁶ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

²⁷ Azzam Publications. “Interview with Scholar of the Mujahideen in Chechnya, Sheikh Abu Umar Mohammed Al Saif, Shatoi.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. January 27, 2000.

²⁸ Azzam Publications. “Interview with Scholar of the Mujahideen in Chechnya, Sheikh Abu Umar Mohammed Al Saif, Shatoi.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. January 27, 2000.

²⁹ Voice of the Caucasus. <http://qoqaz.com/ab.rm>. December 2003.

computers have been installed in each court.”³⁰ According to an internal memorandum on the Chechen conflict by one admitted mujahideen financier, one of the principle reasons for the proliferation of these projects was that Abu Umar “got funding from Gulf countries.”³¹ Indeed, Abu Umar was arguably the central figure involved in fundraising for Khattab’s organization in Chechnya, particularly with regards to soliciting potential donors in the Middle East and Arabian Gulf. Throughout his public speeches and interviews, there is a consistent refrain calling for Muslims to contribute charitable donations in order to support the jihad in the Caucasus. In his January 2000 online interview, Abu Umar cheered, “The supplications of Muslims and their financial support has played an important role in the victories of the Mujahideen. This support has helped mitigate the difficulties faced by the Mujahideen who are lacking adequate supplies of food and medicine. We ask Allah to accept the support given to us by our brothers, and remind the Ummah that coming to the aid of Muslims who are oppressed is a sacred duty that Allah Most High has confirmed in the... Holy Quran.”³² He is even quoted directly in the widely-traveled jihadi instructional booklet, “39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad”: “Failing to provide help or participate in jihad while contenting oneself with following news of the mujahidin from afar through the media is one of the qualities of the hypocrites.”³³

In August 2002, Abu Umar was featured in a video recording documenting a “development conference for the Islamic Government of Chechnya.”³⁴ The need for financial donors occupied the lion share of his address to the camera:

“No doubt that the nation is going through one of the hardest periods, and this period faces a crusader war launched against Islam and Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir and other Islamic regions, and this requires Muslims to unite in one rank and carry jihad with their money and selves to face this international crusader campaign in its war against Islam and Muslims, as Jihad cannot only be carried with words, as words aren’t enough, but also the practical Jihad must accompany it with self and money, and the mujahideen in Chechnya are in the direst need for media support and financial support to establish the military power and establish committees that carry out their roles perfectly, and also to carry out medical works to help the harmed and wounded and to help the orphaned families of martyrs, so these are the huge projects planned, so the government needs a big financial support from the Muslims. What we hope for from Muslims is to support with what Allah has obligated upon them, and to support the mujahideen strongly with what they are capable of [donating] in media and

³⁰ “Global Muslim News - December 1997: Chechnya.” Nida ul-Islam (Australia). Issue 21; December-January 1997-1998. <http://islam.org.au/www.islam.org.au/articles/21/news.htm>.

³¹ “A Brief Recap of the History of the Islamic Movement in Daghestan and Chechnya: Meeting with Enaam Arnaout on 10/18/99.” “Exhibits to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892.


³² Azzam Publications. “Interview with Sheikh Abu Umar Mohammed Al Saif, Shatoi. <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. January 27, 2000.

³³ Al-Salim, Muhammad Bin Ahmad. “39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad.” Booklet reprinted by At-Tibyan Publications, U.K.

³⁴ “Development Conference for the Islamic Government of Chechnya: Introductory Meeting.” <http://www.waislamah.net/meeting1.rm>. August 2002.

money, and we ask Allah to accept from the Muslims and raise their degrees and to reward them on behalf of Islam and [other] Muslims.”³⁵

Despite their growing footprint in the Caucasus region, the mujahideen led by Khattab still faced immense logistical obstacles. Chechnya is a landlocked and economically depressed republic at the bare fringes of the traditional Muslim world, with few natural resources. It is surrounded by predominantly Christian neighbors (the lone exception being Azerbaijan). In reflection on this period, Khattab plainly admitted, “indeed, we had a lot of financial problems. The economic situation was very difficult so we had to limit the number of people we were training.”³⁶ Lacking their own resources, Khattab and his men instead turned to skimming from the activities of religious charities based in the Muslim world, and using funds ostensibly meant for humanitarian aid and instead using them to bolster their own base of support. On December 9, 2000, the English-language Chechen mujahideen website Qoqaz.net published a new section to its list of “frequently asked questions” titled, “Where should we send our donations this winter?” According to that document, “the Zionists and enemies of Islam realise that some money will still reach the sincere individuals in [Chechnya and Afghanistan]. Therefore, they need to physically prevent this money from reaching its destination. A number of methods are used to ensure this: blocking of bank accounts and transfers, disruption of travel of individuals carrying donations, threatening surveillance of donation-collectors and physical confiscation at borders and airports... We have two recommendations this Winter: one to individuals and the second to mosques, centres, and organisations.”³⁷



With regards to his use of charitable donations, the former President of Chechnya, Zaleem Khan, has noted, “Khattab was... adept at dealing with military leaders and officials in the government. And I speak especially about his dealings with the public. He used to take care of the orphans... after their bread earner was martyred in Jihad. Khattab also used to provide for the needs of the poor around his camp.”³⁸ Allegedly, at least one of the Islamic charities involved in the Caucasus—the U.S.-based Global Relief Foundation (GRF)—had “a full time Islamic school located next to Khattab’s Caucasus Islamic Training [Camp].”³⁹ Khattab has boasted of “the Mujahideen in Chechnya...

³⁵ “Development Conference for the Islamic Government of Chechnya:

Introductory Meeting.” <http://www.waislamah.net/meeting1.rm>. August 2002.

³⁶ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

³⁷ <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/faqs.htm#don2001>. January 2001.

³⁸ “The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab” (a.k.a. “The Sword of Islam: Khattab”). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

³⁹ “A Brief Recap of the History of the Islamic Movement in Daghestan and Chechnya: Meeting with Enaam Arnaout on 10/18/99.” “Exhibits to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to

receiving all kinds of support from their brothers and sisters in the Caucasus and from around the world. The support from Muslims everywhere is tremendous, and its positive effects are evident during the course of battle against the enemy.”⁴⁰

The evidence of complicity on the part of those helping to manage the fraudulent charities—both locally and internationally—is rather voluminous and damning. The organizations explicitly seeking to fund the mujahideen included the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), an entity first founded in Saudi Arabia with offices in the United States. Hundreds of thousands of charitable dollars that BIF was raising under the guise of aiding helpless Chechen “civilians” was actually going to furnish militant Muslim holy warriors loyal to Ibn ul-Khattab and his local Chechen allies with mine-proof boots, uniforms, medical equipment, and spending cash for travel and weapons.⁴¹ At the end of the supply chain in the Chechen capital Grozny, Al-Qaida lieutenant Saif ul-Islam al-Masri (a.k.a. “Abu Islam al-Masri”)—a member of Al-Qaida’s military committee with specialized training in building explosives—served as BIF’s local charge d’affaires.⁴² The BIF leadership eventually agreed that “the best way” to transfer supplies into Chechnya was through Azerbaijan. Consequently in late 1995, Gul Mohamed, an aide to the notorious Afghan mujahideen commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, established a BIF branch office in Baku to “serve as a conduit of relief supplies.”⁴³

In June 1995, a BIF official based in the U.S., Suleman Ahmer, traveled to Baku and subsequently wrote a lengthy internal memorandum on what he had witnessed there. He began the report by noting, “The primary objective of this hurried trip was to carry and safely deliver a mobile X-Ray unit to the representative of Chechen freedom fighters in Baku... The secondary objective was to meet the people, based in Baku, who are responsible for coordinating the relief efforts to the Chechen Mujahideen, populace, and refugee.”⁴⁴ Ahmer detailed his meetings with Chechen political and military leaders in Baku, who “welcomed B.I.F.’s humanitarian help and assured to become an effective conduit to pass on the proposed aid, cash or kind, most expeditiously to the Mujahideen... Any aid from us in cash or kind should better be routed through... any tried and/or trusted Chechen who is deeply committed to the cause and has active field

Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892.

⁴⁰ Azzam Publications. “Interview with Foreign Mujahideen Commander , Ibn-ul-Khattab.”

<http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. January 24, 2000.

⁴¹ “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. January 31, 2003. Page 75.

⁴² “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. January 31, 2003. Page 27.

⁴³ “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. January 31, 2003. Page 82.

⁴⁴ Exhibit BIF-1B087-01-03475. “Re: VISIT TO BAKU, AZERBAIJAN; JUNE 7-14, 1995.” “Exhibits to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout, United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892.

participation in the on-going Jihad.”⁴⁵ In a follow-up fax message sent to other BIF administrators in the U.S., Ahmer warned:

“The people raising money ... having a problem transferring money to Chechnya. The only way to transfer money to Chechnya is through a person. That is someone from Pakistan can bring in cash as it is allowed by both the governments... We can transfer the money to Islamabad and then take it out and have someone carry it on his person... My suggestion for the future plan is as follows: if we can receive some money in advance, say around \$500,000, then I can transfer that money to Chechnya personally when I go... there.”⁴⁶

Another purported humanitarian organization allegedly engaged in financing Khattab and the Chechen mujahideen was the Qatar Charitable Society (QCS), the oldest and largest such group based in Qatar.⁴⁷ In October 2001, the Azerbaijan Ministry of Justice forcibly closed down its own local QCS office for, “under the disguise of charity,” conducting “damaging activities that violate our national interests, as well as [cooperating] with terrorist structures and [distributing] propaganda inciting radical sectarianism, religious hatred and fanaticism.”⁴⁸ In 1995, a QCS office founded in neighboring Dagestan dispensed over 3 million Qatari Riyals in less than two years.⁴⁹ Russian intelligence became suspicious when they discovered that the QCS branch was being run by an Egyptian citizen named Yasir Ibrahim. Dagestani state tax police initiated an inquiry into the organization, and uncovered forged documents and invoices detailing hundreds of thousands of dollars of illicit financial transactions. From the evidence they collected, investigators estimated that QCS had given perhaps as much as \$1 million to unspecified “Chechen extremists.” Yet, the true numbers will likely never be known because, as the Russians discovered to their dismay, “most of the ‘charitable contributions’... were not recorded anywhere. The same goes for how the money was distributed.”⁵⁰

By liquidating charity bank accounts into untraceable cash withdrawals in war-torn states (often with no reliable banking systems), QCS was able to make this money simply disappear. Journalists confronted Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jabr Al-Thani with Russian allegations that QCS was openly and actively supporting “certain Arab individuals... fighting with the Chechen fighters.” With little hesitation, Al-Thani flatly admitted that, indeed, this might be the case:

⁴⁵ Exhibit BIF-1B087-01-03475. “Re: VISIT TO BAKU, AZERBAIJAN; JUNE 7-14, 1995.” “Exhibits to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892.

⁴⁶ Fax transmission from Suleman Ahmer to Enaam Arnaout and Muzaffar Khan (dated May 12, 1995). Exhibit BIF-1B087-01-03725. “Exhibits to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Position Paper as to Sentencing Factors.” United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892.

⁴⁷ “Voluntary and Charitable Organizations.” <http://www.dohaislamicsummit.org/qatar/english/islamic-e.htm>. March 1, 2003.

⁴⁸ “Azerbaijan closes offices of Arab relief organizations due to illegal activity.” Interfax News Agency. April 10, 2002. See also: “Azerbaijan shuts down Kuwaiti, Qatar charity organizations.” Turan News Agency (Baku). Broadcast in Russian language. April 9, 2002; 1530GMT.

⁴⁹ “Charity denies Russian charges of assisting Dagestan rebels.” Al-Rayah. September 20, 1999.

⁵⁰ Segodnya (Moscow). November 16, 1999.

“[W]e as a government cannot control the aid going abroad, some of which may go for humanitarian goals, and some may start as humanitarian but end up in another way. However, there is no monitoring because people are sympathizing... We as a government may be able to control our sympathy, although in the end we are only human beings and Muslims... [t]herefore we cannot restrain the people’s feelings in this regard.”⁵¹

Khattab’s unique access to outside financing and logistical support provided a powerful incentive for would-be Chechen Islamists to join along in his cause. The most important indigenous Chechen commander to invest in a partnership with Khattab was the notorious Shamil Basayev. During a later interview with a jihadi news agency, Basayev spoke of once serving in the Soviet military before leaving to join the fight against “the Russians and the Crusaders... in the region of Abkhazia... [and] the Azeri province of Karabakh. After the revolution of 1991 (which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union) I returned to Chechnya and formed several units that were trained in Afghanistan, and then dispatched to join the Mujahideen in Tajikistan.”⁵² Basayev gained fame during the peak of hostilities of the first Russo-Chechen war when he launched several major military operations and achieved a series of stunning victories. He later boasted of his role leading “the well-known and successful operation against the Russian city of Budunsk”, where he and his men seized 1,600 innocent hostages at a hospital nearly 100 kilometers inside Russian territory (129 civilians died as a result).⁵³ Basayev also spoke of the particular influence of the Arab-Afghan volunteers in Chechnya: “We have benefited from studying the Afghan Jihad, particularly after Commanders Khattab, Yaqub Al-Ghamidi and his deputy Abu Waleed Al-Ghamidi, Abu Jafar Al-Yemeni, Hakim Al-Madani and Abu Bakr Aqeedah, (may Allah have mercy upon these two), explained to us the details of what happened in Afghanistan. We studied the various dimensions and developments of their cause and we are knowledgeable about what happened.”⁵⁴ In February 2000, he acknowledged receiving “aid provided by Saudi Arabia”, but insisted, “the aid we are receiving is from the general public and not the government.”⁵⁵

Despite the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, the mood remained tense in the region, until it ignited into open conflict once again in the summer of 1999. Indigenous allies of Khattab from across the border in the neighboring territory of Dagestan grew emboldened and declared the rule of Shariah (Islamic law) in several Muslim villages, chasing out the local police. Alarmed at the spread of hardline Islamism from Chechnya into Dagestan, the Russian military immediately dispatched troops to stabilize the region and re-establish secular law and order. In video footage dated August 29, 1999, Khattab was recorded speaking to his lieutenants in front of a large map of the

⁵¹ Bin Qinnah, Khadijah. “Minister denies Russian report on funding for Chechen militants.” Al-Jazeera Television. Broadcast in Arabic language. November 22, 1999; 2040GMT.

⁵² Azzam Publications. “World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. February 21, 2000.

⁵³ Azzam Publications. “World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. February 21, 2000.

⁵⁴ Azzam Publications. “World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. February 21, 2000.

⁵⁵ Azzam Publications. “World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev.” <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. February 21, 2000.

Chechen-Dagestani border, explaining, "These events started after the counsel of more than 17 scholars inside Dagestan and after the counsel of the congress and some of the military leaders, either in Dagestan or in Chechnya. We agreed that troops of the mujahideen from Chechnya will enter Dagestan in the places where the Russian forces entered."⁵⁶ Khattab responded angrily to suggestions that his own provocative behavior was to blame for the return of the Russian army:

"Are we supposed to wait for the Russians to come and annihilate us and destroy everything?! ...We got tired of these charades... In Dagestan, some villages announced the implementation of the Islamic law and they expelled the police... And here [in Dagestan], if the government seeks the help of the Russians, the public will seek the help of the Mujahideen. And we enter before the Russians and be defensive, let the Russians attack and we will defend. That was the idea... To let the Russian forces enter gives us the right to enter as well... Some people said it was our fault, but we could not hold back our support for them."⁵⁷

Yet, in the long run, Khattab's decision to invade Dagestan in August 1999 with his Arab-Afghan troops and their Chechen Islamist allies proved to be a fateful one. The nascent frontline in Dagestan quickly collapsed, and once again, the Russian army was drawn back into fighting inside Chechnya. The era of "Preparation, Dawah, and Relief work" had come to an end, replaced by a new period of open warfare with the Russians perhaps even more brutal than the first. Mujahideen propaganda videos such as "Russian Hell in the Year 2000" depict some of the desperate and chaotic fighting that followed, including bloody close encounters between the guerillas and Russian convoys, and the execution of wounded prisoners by Khattab himself. As the second Russo-Chechen war unfolded in the years that followed, Khattab and other subsequent mujahideen commanders would pioneer many of the jihadi tactics that have prominently surfaced in other conflicts, from Afghanistan to Iraq—including roadside bombings, suicide attacks, and the "Black Widows" (female operatives disguised as civilians). The Russian government has blamed Khattab for a campaign of bombings primarily targeting residential apartment buildings in Moscow that coincided with the start of hostilities in Dagestan in August 1999. While the Saudi never acknowledged his responsibility for those acts, he made several analogous public threats. Cradling his weapon while sitting in a wooded area of Chechnya, Khattab was recorded vowing, "We won't just be smashing the Russian positions in Chechnya... Listen, Putin. See how we thrashed your soldiers here. You sit wait and see who comes to you!"⁵⁸ He mocked Russian efforts "to capture the leaders of the Mujahideen. And with the favor of Allah, they will not be able to get anything, if there is any meeting, then it will be in Russia—with the permission of Allah."⁵⁹ With regards to terrorist attacks on Western targets, Khattab has been quoted as

⁵⁶ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁵⁷ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁵⁸ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁵⁹ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

stating, "There is no difference between the American Army and the Russian Army. They seized our territory, and Muslims have the right to seek such a solution."⁶⁰

In March 2002, after more than two years of renewed fighting, Khattab was finally killed by assassins recruited from within his own organization by Russian security services, slain by a poisoned letter. Though his death failed to deter Shamil Basayev and Abu Umar al-Saif, among others, from continuing on their mission of jihad in the Caucasus, the passing of Khattab was deeply mourned among supporters of the mujahideen. Shaykh Abdullah ibn Jibreen, a senior cleric in Saudi Arabia and an ardent advocate for jihad, insisted, "the Jihad of our brothers in that country, Chechnya, is a Jihad for the sake of Allah, we consider it to be like that... [As for] the Mujahideen, we say we must continue in supporting them, even if some of them are killed, and even if their head who was their leader was killed, there is no doubt that Allah will give victory to whoever takes his position, from his brothers, those who gave their best for the sake of Allah."⁶¹ Meanwhile, Basayev and Abu Umar continued to mount missions and campaigns long after Khattab's death. In October 2002, a suicide unit loyal to Shamil Basayev took 800 people hostage at a theater performance in Moscow, threatening to kill them if Russia did not withdraw its forces from Chechnya immediately. Nearly 115 hostages died during an attempt by Russian special forces to end the standoff. In a statement claiming responsibility for the incident, Basayev threatened, "People without any demands, who will not be taking anyone hostage, will come next time... [Their] main goal will be destroying the enemy and exacting maximum damage."⁶² In September 2004, another suicide unit operating under Basayev's orders stormed an elementary school in the town of Beslan, Ingushetia. By the end of that siege, at least 320 innocent people were killed, including children. Nonetheless, Basayev claimed credit for the Beslan massacre, blaming the casualties on aggressive behavior by Russian special forces: "The battalion of Shakhid, Riyad us-Saliheen, thinks that Putin and leaders of the world community, who blessed the slaughter, are fully responsible for what happened."⁶³

III.) The Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation

The Al-Haramain Charitable Foundation was a Saudi non-profit evangelical charity that engages in relief works around the world. It had more than 40 international branches working in over fifty countries, and in 1999 spent more than \$61 million on various projects worldwide.⁶⁴ Al-Haramain also maintained a presence and local offices in the continental United States; primarily, in the states of Missouri and Oregon. When asked in Arab news interviews whether Al-Haramain retained "tight control" over its

⁶⁰ Gall, Carlotta. "Muslim Fighter Embraces Warrior Mystique." The New York Times. October 17, 1999. Section 1; *Page 16*.

⁶¹ "The Life and Times of Ibn-ul-Khattab" (a.k.a. "The Sword of Islam: Khattab"). Video produced by Waislamah.net; ©2004.

⁶² "Chechen warlord claims theatre attack." BBC News. November 1, 2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2388857.stm>.

⁶³ <http://www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2004/09/17/25985.shtml>. September 17, 2004. See also: "Excerpts: Basayev claims Beslan." BBC News. September 17, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3665136.stm>.

⁶⁴ "Saudi Arabia's top Islamic charity denies any of its assets frozen." Agence France Presse. March 13, 2002.

affiliates, the charity's Director-General in Saudi Arabia Shaykh Aqeel Abdulaziz al-'Aqeel responded:

"Yes, of course. The offices' directors are employees who follow the directions of the main office with regards to hiring workers at the offices and making any decisions on cooperation with any party. In the main office, there are 19 auditors. Each of the foundation's specialized committees has an auditor. There are monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports on the foundation's revenue and expenditure."⁶⁵

Since the mid-1990s, Al-Haramain has come under official investigation by a variety of international governments and law enforcement agencies. In January 1995, the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), a Saudi dissident group aligned with Usama Bin Laden, reported that Saudi authorities were scrutinizing the activities of Al-Haramain. According to CDLR, "[a]ttacks on voluntary work still continue after the closure of many voluntary or organisations. [King] Fahd has now turned his beady attention to the Al Haramain institution."⁶⁶ When Italian counterterrorism police raided a suspected Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya terrorist guesthouse and headquarters in Milan in 1995, they discovered a confidential letter sent to wanted Egyptian terrorist Shaykh Anwar Shaaban from Albania detailing efforts to distribute Al-Gama'at's official magazine, Al-Murabitoun, amongst the personnel working at the Al-Haramain charitable organization in the Balkans.⁶⁷

Even the Bosnian Muslim Army's own military intelligence service began issuing warnings about the local charitable activities of the Al-Haramain Foundation. In May 1995, the service sent a lengthy analytical report to senior Bosnian Army commanders regarding the foreign mujahideen, warning about the "so-called humanitarians, that are in charge of propaganda of the ideas, that these persons are approaching with, with mainly religious teaching – called 'DAWA' (spreading of the religion in the manner of 'vehabijski mesheb')... They manly act through the work of humanitarian organizations 'Islamic Balkan's Center', 'Organization for the Regeneration of Islamic Thought, Kuwait' and 'Al-Haramain.'"⁶⁸ The Bosnian Muslim military was cautioned that these organizations were "abus[ing] the humanitarian aid, in a way that they condition the acceptance of the same with the acceptance of 'DAWA'":

"In order to win as many as possible followers among the population, these patrons of the 'new' approach to religion, are visiting the families of soldiers killed in war and offer them aid 100-200 KM in case they accept their way of religion, if not they tell them that their killed member will not be 'sehid' (killed Muslim soldier)... The consequence of this is the already present polarization between Bosnian-Muslim population and that could have far reaching damaging consequences in the next period. These consequences were

⁶⁵ Al-Qudayhi, Anis. "Interview with Aqil al-Aqil, general manager of the charitable Al-Haramayn Foundation." *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London). March 16, 2002.

⁶⁶ The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). "Your Right to Know." *CDLR Monitor*. No. 30; January 13, 1995.

⁶⁷ DIGOS (Italy) Anti-Terrorism Report. "Searches at the Islamic Cultural Center, Viale Jenner 50, Milano, 6/26/1995." Dated September 15, 1997.

⁶⁸ "Review of the Information on Activities of the Persons from Afro-Asian Countries Directly Before the War and During the War in the Territory of BIH Republic." Report written by the BIH Administration of the Military Security Service–Department for Analytical and Informative Affairs." Sarajevo; May 6, 1995.

also pointed by one source from the Military security service, from the category of persons that come from Afro-Asian countries and who said: 'You will deal easily with Arabs, you will expel them at one moment, but you will have your youth indoctrinated youth.' To support these claims, the source pointed out that the activities of the followers (vehabije) in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir and on Philippines resulted in mutual confrontations of Moslems from different 'meshebs'... This leads to polarization between Bosniaks-Moslems, that could in future have wider scale, and it could even bring to the open mutual confrontations of the followers of the traditional approach to religion and those that accept the 'new' approach."⁶⁹

A separate analytical chart issued by the Bosnian-Muslim military intelligence service in November 1995 depicting the hierarchy of the Mujahideen Brigade identified "H.O. 'AL HARAMAIN'" as one of the chief "Foreign Donors to 'El Mudzahidin.'"⁷⁰ On March 11, 2002, the U.S. Treasury moved to freeze the assets of the Al-Haramain branch in Bosnia-Herzegovina, charging that it was providing financing to foreign terrorist organizations. Investigators suggested that Al-Haramain's Bosnia office had been linked to the terrorist group Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya, and that Saudi citizen Wael Jalaidan (a close friend and aide of Usama Bin Laden) was authorized to withdraw money from its local bank account.⁷¹

Al Haramain was officially banned in Kenya shortly after the devastating U.S. Embassy bombings in August 1998 because the charity was believed to have had a role in the attack.⁷² At the time, John Etemesi, chairman of the Kenyan Non-Governmental Coordinating Board, explained that Al-Haramain "had been found to be working against the interests of Kenyans in terms of security... Our investigations reveal that the operations of these organizations are inconsistent with the reasons for which they were registered."⁷³ Wadih El-Hage, Usama Bin Laden's personal secretary, was a principle convicted conspirator in the 1998 embassy bombings. El-Hage's book of business cards exhibited at the federal trials in New York contains a card for "Mansour A. Al-Kadi" as the "Deputy General Director and Head of Africa-Committee of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation."⁷⁴ "Mansuor [sic] Al-Kadi" is also listed as the Vice President of Al-Haramain's Ashland, Oregon office on IRS 990 Forms from fiscal year 2000.⁷⁵ Al-

⁶⁹ "Review of the Information on Activities of the Persons from Afro-Asian Countries Directly Before the War and During the War in the Territory of BiH Republic." Report written by the BIH Administration of the Military Security Service—Department for Analytical and Informative Affairs." Sarajevo; May 6, 1995.

⁷⁰ "Foreign Donors to 'El Mudzahidin'" ("Donatori Jedinice 'El Mudzahidin'"). "Shema Hijerarhijskih Odnosa OpO 'Vazal.'" Memorandum issued by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) Military Security Service. November 28, 1995.

⁷¹ Hecimovic, Esad. "Blockading Young Muslims' Way—Misuse of Humanitarian Funds To Support Terrorism." *Dani* (Sarajevo). November 22, 2002. Pages 36-39.

⁷² Jeannine Aversa. "U.S. blocks assets of Islamic charity's operations in Bosnia and Somalia." *Associated Press*. March 11, 2002.

⁷³ "Kenya bans six Islamic aid agencies after U.S. Embassy bombing." *Associated Press*. September 9, 1998.

⁷⁴ *U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, et al.* United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 116 F. Supp. 2d 489; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14507. October 5, 2000, Decided. October 5, 2000, Filed. Government exhibits GX-207 to GX-364.

⁷⁵ IRS 990 Form fiscal year 2000 for the "Al-Haramain Foundation."

Haramain's English-language website further identifies Al-Kadi as a member of its global Board of Trustees.⁷⁶

Regarding the U.S. presence in the Muslim world, two months after the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, the Al-Haramain English-language newsletter read:

"The war of the Christian Crusaders is today at its most intense... The Muslim whose mind has not been corrupted cannot bear to see the unbelievers wielding authority, and ordering and prohibiting in his own country. Therefore such a Muslim strives his utmost to expel and distance them - even if he has to sacrifice his own life, or his most cherished possession, for this cause."⁷⁷

Likewise, in May 1999, the Al-Haramain English newsletter carried an article endorsing the position of noted Muslim lecturer Jamal al-Din Zarabozo: "What we need are Muslims who are totally committed to Islam... People who are willing to sacrifice for Allah's sake and not fear the harm of anyone. This is what we need. We need a real commitment to Islam. We must strive to support the Muslims and jihads throughout the world with our lives and our wealth."⁷⁸ In the February 2000 Al-Haramain newsletter, a columnist wrote, "Jihaad is a religious obligation in Islaam. Its aim is to fight oppression and injustice and to remove obstacles which prevent the spread of Islaam. This is accomplish[ed] either by weakening or destroying the disbelieving prevalent political powers so that Muslims can prevent anyone from persecuting their brother Muslims wherever they may be."⁷⁹

The official Al-Haramain website carried regularly updated reports on the "The Jihaad In Chechnya" in the form of copies of communiqués issued to "the President of the Asian committee" of Al-Haramain from its representative in Chechnya, Abdul-Lateef Ad-Diraan.⁸⁰ Likewise, in a leaked internal memo, the Russian FSB security service accused the Al-Haramain Foundation of transferring \$1 million to Chechen Muslim rebels in 1999 and additionally arranging the purchase on their behalf of 500 "heavy weapons" from the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to the Washington Post, the memo quoted purported written exchanges between Arab-Afghan military commanders in Chechnya and Al-Haramain's "director" back in the Saudi Kingdom: "Today, Al-Haramain has \$50 million for the needs of the mujaheddin... The reason al Haramain provides assistance a little bit at a time is because it is afraid of the accusations it is assisting the jihad."⁸¹

During the early months of 2000, the Arabic-language version of the Al-Haramain website specifically advertised "sponsoring instructors at the Kavkaz Institute, as well as 25 judges in the Shariah courts."⁸² Both the Arabic and English versions of the site also offered scanned copies of two fatwahs endorsing the act of providing financing to the

⁷⁶ <http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/eng/inner.asp?order=1&num=1>.

⁷⁷ Shaykh Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz. "The Ideological Attack." Al-Haramain Newsletter. Vol. 2; No. 10. October 1998.

⁷⁸ <http://www.alharamain.org/english/newsletter/issue23/feature23.htm>. May 1999.

⁷⁹ Mosher, A. "Jihaad." Al-Haramain Newsletter. Vol. 4; No. 3. February 2000.

⁸⁰ http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/chechniya/chech_eng01.html. October 2000. See also:

http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/chechniya/chech_eng04.html. October 2000.

⁸¹ LaFraniere, Sharon. "How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya Secular Separatist Movement Transformed by Militant Vanguard." The Washington Post. April 26, 2003. Page A01.

⁸² <http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/chechniya/arabic/page01.htm>. May 2000.

mujahideen in Chechnya issued by Shaykh Abdullah ibn Jibreen and Abu Umar al-Saif's former clerical mentor, Shaykh Mohammed ibn Uthameen.⁸³ According to the fatwah from Shaykh ibn Jibreen, titled "The Situation of the Mujahideen, and the Duties of Muslims Towards Them":

"It is no secret that which has come to exist recently in the country of Chechnya and Daghestan in terms of the communist aggression and that which has occurred as a result of it in killing, displacement, destruction and oppressive harm... It is obligatory upon the Muslims to firstly, supplicate for their Brothers (and Sisters) in that land for victory to overcome their enemies. Secondly, to supply them with weapons and real power with which they are able to strive and kill their enemies (on the battlefield). And, thirdly, to strengthen them with financial donations, as they are in desperate need of food, clothing and all such things... No doubt, the Jihad with money is from that which is rewarded and Allah has recommended Jihad with oneself in many verses... We ask Allah to assist His Religion and raise His Word and grant the Mujahideen victory in every land and make firm their foothold."⁸⁴

In his own fatwah published on the Al-Haramain website, Shaykh Mohammed ibn Uthameen was asked for his "judgment regarding spending charities and Zakat to Muslims" in the Caucasus region "supporting them by self and by wealth." The cleric responded, "giving charity and Zakat for Muslims in the Caucasus, and especially in Chechnya, is permitted, as zakat will be for the Mujahideen and the poor."⁸⁵ The fatwah of Shaykh ibn Uthameen posted on Alharamain.org appears to be the identical same fatwah also posted on the website Qoqaz.com ("Voice of the Caucasus"), the official website of the Chechen mujahideen.⁸⁶ Likewise, the main English-language section of the Al-Haramain website about the "Jihad in Chechnya" contains a prominent and direct "Chechnya web link" to <http://www.qoqaz.com>.⁸⁷

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon has provided me with a series of evidentiary documents, including the affidavit of an agent with the Russian Federal Police Service (FSB), Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. According to Ignatchenko, "Al-Haramain actively provided financial support to Dagestani, Chechen and Ingush religious extremist groups, followers of Wahhabi ideology":

"These groups were aiming to overthrow the existing constitutional system in those republics, secede from Russia and create a so-called Islamic state in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. We found out that large sums of money in the form of foreign currency were received by... the so-called Kavkaz Islamic Institute (village of Serzhen-Yurt, Chechen Republic). The money was received through one of the branches of the foundation, located in the city of Baku (Azerbaijan)... Despite the fact that officially the funds were intended for religious events of Muslim holiday celebrations, the

⁸³ <http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/chechniya/english/page06.htm>. October 2000.

⁸⁴ <http://www.alharamain.org/images/ibn-jibreen.jpg>. October 2000. See also:

<http://www.alharamain.org/english/images/ibn-jibreen.jpg>. October 2000.

⁸⁵ <http://www.alharamain.org/images/sk-uthaymin.jpg>. October 2000. See also:

<http://www.alharamain.org/english/images/sk-uthaymin.jpg>. October 2000.

⁸⁶ <http://www.qoqaz.com/fatwa.jpg>. March 2000. See also: <http://www.qoqaz.com/fatwa.htm>. March 2000.

⁸⁷ <http://www.alharamain.org/alharamain/chechniya/english/page05.htm>. March 2000.

money was used to support terrorist organizations—to purchase weapons, uniforms, medicine, communication devices, vehicles, and to pay religious extremists' salaries.”⁸⁸

Ignatchenko specifically reported “Chechen separatists” receiving 480,000 Saudi Riyals “through Al-Haramain channels from someone by the name of Mansur bin Abd-al-Rahman Al-Qadi.”⁸⁹ It should be recalled that, at the time, Mansour al-Kadi was the “Deputy General Director and Head of Africa-Committee of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation.”⁹⁰ The FSB agent also accused “leaders of Al-Haramain” with knowingly providing illicit financing to the mujahideen in the Caucasus: “the leaders didn't want to expose their improper activities, but did not decline the cooperation of Chechen militants either. This message sent to Chechnya in February of 2000 provides a good illustration: ‘Al-Haramain will provide assistance in small installments to avoid accusations of supporting Jihad.’”⁹¹ Ignatchenko identified at least two examples of such behavior by Al-Haramain Director-General Shaykh Aqeel al-Aqeel: “In February of 2000 an emissary from Chechnya (name unknown) informed Sheikh 'Aqil bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Aqil about preparing major terrorist operations against Russian troops during the presidential elections campaign. Tomorrow night you will receive a fax from us with the outlines of ‘Argun’ and ‘Grozny’ operations. Review and discuss it.”⁹² Later, Ignatchenko added:

“We intercepted a message from abroad that, according to our data, was sent by 'Aqil Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Aqil to Taj (warlord Khattab): ‘The cargo is ready to be shipped: RPGs and rounds of ammunition for them, along with rounds for other systems; machine guns, Kalashnikov assault rifles, sniper rifles. We purchased 1000 rounds of ammunition, AGS, one PTUR ‘Fagot’, 500 [bulletproof] vests.’ In response, Khattab asks to immediately send 500 sets of summer and winter weight uniforms, sleeping bags and shoes: ‘I don’t care how much you have to pay—1,000, 2,000, or 5,000. Make an urgent delivery by car... We are in dire need of tents.’”⁹³

It should be noted that the behavior described above by FSB agent Ignatchenko is remarkably analogous to similar fraudulent activities in the Caucasus by competing religious charities (such as the Benevolence International Foundation, the Global Relief

⁸⁸ Interview by Deputy Chief of the 3rd Department of Russian FSB Investigative Division, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.V. Romanovskiy of former FSB operative Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. Moscow, Russia; December 3, 2008. (Transcribed January 26, 2009). File #: 315N PD 45427. Job #: 883.

⁸⁹ Interview by Deputy Chief of the 3rd Department of Russian FSB Investigative Division, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.V. Romanovskiy of former FSB operative Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. Moscow, Russia; December 3, 2008. (Transcribed January 26, 2009). File #: 315N PD 45427. Job #: 883.

⁹⁰ U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, et al. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 116 F. Supp. 2d 489; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14507. October 5, 2000, Decided. October 5, 2000, Filed. Government exhibits GX-207 to GX-364.

⁹¹ Interview by Deputy Chief of the 3rd Department of Russian FSB Investigative Division, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.V. Romanovskiy of former FSB operative Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. Moscow, Russia; December 3, 2008. (Transcribed January 26, 2009). File #: 315N PD 45427. Job #: 883.

⁹² Interview by Deputy Chief of the 3rd Department of Russian FSB Investigative Division, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.V. Romanovskiy of former FSB operative Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. Moscow, Russia; December 3, 2008. (Transcribed January 26, 2009). File #: 315N PD 45427. Job #: 883.

⁹³ Interview by Deputy Chief of the 3rd Department of Russian FSB Investigative Division, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V.V. Romanovskiy of former FSB operative Sergey Nikolayevich Ignatchenko. Moscow, Russia; December 3, 2008. (Transcribed January 26, 2009). File #: 315N PD 45427. Job #: 883.

Foundation, and the Qatar Charitable Society). It is also consistent with matching irregularities that have surfaced in Al-Haramain Foundation operations and financing in other conflict zones, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

IV.) The Websites of the Islamic Army of the Caucasus: Kavkazcenter.com, Qoqaz.com, and Qoqaz.net

Prior to the emergence of the Internet, contemporary insurgencies and terrorist organizations were at a serious disadvantage compared to their adversaries in matters of communication, coordination, and media access. A fixed television channel or radio station can be an easy target for an organized military force, as the Israeli government has proven with its repeated strikes on the Hezbollah broadcast company known as "Al-Manar" in Lebanon. Years of effort and hard-earned financing channeled to build the physical infrastructure necessary to support traditional media and communications methods can be obliterated in an instant by a single laser-guided missile dropped from an enemy aircraft. Even inviting mainstream media to do their own independent interviews and reporting can come with serious risks. Journalists can secretly be employed as spies (or assassins, as in the case of the late Afghan warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud), and groups like the Islamic Army of the Caucasus have little control over the message of the media once journalists leave the conflict zone. Propaganda videos that Khattab, Basayev, and their heirs amongst the mujahideen took months to film, edit, and create are boiled down into 30-second cable news segments that present an incomplete picture of what the organization is attempting to achieve. As such, the advent of the Internet has caused a revolution in media, especially among underground political organizations with limited fixed resources like the militants based in the Caucasus. The leaders of the Chechen jihad can now speak directly to a broad, globalized audience without worrying about imminent security dangers or filtering of their message. Potential recruits and would-be donors can be solicited far from the narrow confines of the traditional Muslim world.

In July 2000, during an online interview, Commander Shamil Basayev was asked what Internet sites he would recommend for information about the jihad in Chechnya:

"We have two websites; the first is in Russian and is overseen by brother Movladi Ugudov and the second site is 'Voice of the Caucasus' which is in Arabic, English and 15 other languages and reports news from the Front Line as well as details about military developments and events in Chechnya. The first site is primarily political and is focused at responding to the lies circulated by the Russian media."⁹⁴

The "first site" that Basayev refers to appears to be <http://www.kavkazcenter.com>, a well-traveled Russian and English-language website offering statements from the mujahideen and video recordings of their military operations. Yet, it is the "second site" cited by Basayev, "the Voice of the Caucasus" (a/k/a "Sawt al-Qoqaz"), which is most closely associated with the foreign fighters championed by deceased Saudi national Ibn-ul-Khattab. Over its nearly decade-long existence, the Arabic-language version of "Voice of the Caucasus" has been overseen by unknown parties and is normally hosted at

⁹⁴ Azzam Publications. "Exclusive Interview with Commander of Mujahideen Forces in Chechnya, Shamil Basayev." <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. July 1, 2000.

<http://www.qoqaz.com>. The website Qoqaz.com has previously surfaced in connection with charitable organizations suspected of channeling illicit donations to the Chechen mujahideen. When FBI agents searched the Illinois office of the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), they found a copy of a document dated February 2000 and titled, "A Call to All Muslims" from "The Commanders of the Mujahideen in Chechnya," with a watermark identifying it as having been downloaded from "WWW.QoQaz.Com." In discussing the fighting in Chechnya, the commanders ask: "And today thousands of your fellow Muslims are being killed, yet where is your support for us?" Investigating agents who searched BIF offices also recovered a copy of an "Update on Chechnya Fighting" which "was compiled from the web site www.qoqaz.com."⁹⁵

During one of his many online interviews, when asked to name "Internet sites that focus on the importance of Jihad in Chechnya", Khattab himself responded, "you can access our website, Jihad in Chechnya (www.qoqaz.net), that is also translated into 12 languages thanks to the efforts of some brothers and sisters around the World."⁹⁶ The English version of the website cited by Khattab, <http://www.qoqaz.net>, was the production of a U.K.-based organization providing logistical support to mujahideen networks known as "Azzam Publications" (a/k/a "Azzam.com"). A video clip publicly released by Azzam Publications shows Khattab speaking in Arabic at a mujahideen leadership meeting in Chechnya, with corresponding English subtitles. Khattab explains:

"The brothers in Britain, may Allah reward them, have put in much efforts to publicize the Jihad. There is an organization by the name of Azzam Publications, which is run by brothers who are known to us and maintain regular contact with us. So anyone who wishes to support us or requires any further information about the situation here, they should contact this organization. We keep them informed with news updates about the state of affairs here, so if the people have any questions we can answer them through this organization. So the brothers at Azzam Publications, may Allah preserve them, are cooperating with us in media efforts. They have made many commendable efforts to publicize the Jihad, so if you make contact with them and support them, Inshallah, it will be very beneficial."⁹⁷

Indeed, between approximately the years of 1996 and 2002, Azzam Publications reigned as the undisputed top mujahideen propaganda site on the Internet, featuring jihad training manuals, interviews with Al-Qaida leaders and associates, and the stories of many fallen jihadi "martyrs." During this time, the website was available through a series of varying Internet domain names, including (but not limited to): www.azzam.com, www.qoqaz.net, www.azzam.co.uk, and www.qoqaz.co.uk. According to an official statement from the administrators of the Azzam Publications website, "By the end of July 2002, the Americans concluded that there was no useful intelligence to be gleaned from

⁹⁵ "Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements." United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout. United States District Court Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Case #: 02 CR 892. January 31, 2003. Page 92.

⁹⁶ Azzam Publications. "World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev." <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/interviews.htm>. February 21, 2000.

⁹⁷ Azzam Publications. "The Martyrs of Bosnia: Part I." PAL/NTSC Format. Length: 150 minutes approximately. ©2000.

leaving our site open and they... delivered a written order to the local authorities asking them to immediately shut down our site. Our site has remained shut since then, but we have continued to post daily news bulletins on other web-sites, such as Waaqiah.com.”⁹⁸

During a recent security operation that resulted in the convictions of several defendants in a U.K. crown court, SO-13 Anti-Terrorist Branch investigators recovered logs of online conversations taking place over the Microsoft Network (MSN), wherein one defendant acknowledges, “i been searching for some gud[sic] Jihad websites...but when I used to be online it used to be only azzam.com qoqaz.co.uk etc.”⁹⁹ In a written reply to criticism by JihadUnspun.com, Azzam Publications explained its mission in its own words:

“Azzam Publications is an independent media organisation, established in 1996, that has been providing authentic news and information about Jihad and the Mujahideen everywhere, from a network of informed correspondents on the ground in troubled hotspots... Since November 2001, Azzam.com has been providing authentic news, information, interviews and statements about the current Jihad in Afghanistan, from sources and correspondents on the ground inside Afghanistan. Another one of Azzam's correspondents, Shaheed Suraqah Al-Andalusi, was killed in December 2001, in the Battle for Tora Bora, by an American cluster bomb. His biography and will were published on Azzam.com early in 2002, and any of the Foreign Mujahideen commanders in Afghanistan today can confirm the efforts of Shaheed Suraqah Al-Andalusi in providing media coverage of the events in Afghanistan.”¹⁰⁰

In September 2002, another statement from Azzam Publications offered further detail on its risky ongoing mission:

“...upon its launch in 1996, Azzam.com was one of the first Islamic web-sites on the Internet and the first web-site dedicated to Jihad and Mujahideen news and information. Allah has enabled us, with meagre resources and little technological experience, to provide information on the Mujahideen and to provide daily news and interviews from the Jihad in Chechnya (from September 1999 to August 2001) and the Jihad in Afghanistan from November 2001 until today. A great deal of effort and sacrifice goes into providing a single news bulletin and those involved in the news process put themselves at risk from either the missiles or the prying eyes of unfriendly authorities. The last six years have seen at least two of our correspondents killed... The first of these was Masood Al-Benini, from Benin, who was martyred in Chechnya in April 2000 whilst attempting to leave the country after receiving a serious shrapnel injury to his thigh. His vehicle was ambushed by the Russians at a checkpoint and he fought to defend himself until he was killed - may Allah accept him as a martyr.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Azzam Publications. “Statement from Azzam.Com Regarding Closure of its Web-Site.” E-mail statement issued on September 24, 2002.

⁹⁹ “Other Assessments for Mr. Edis.” Operation Xango (Regina v. Mohammed Irfan Raja, Usman Malik, Aitzaz Zafar, Awaab Iqbal, and Akbar Butt). SO-13 Anti-Terrorist Branch. October 19, 2006. Page 219.

¹⁰⁰ Open letter issued by Azzam Publications titled “In Defence of the Mujahideen.” November 6, 2002. <http://www.azzam.com>.

¹⁰¹ Azzam Publications. “Statement from Azzam.Com Regarding Closure of its Web-Site.” E-mail statement issued on September 24, 2002.

As previously cited in this report, the real name of “Masood al-Benin” was Xavier Jaffo, a French national and close family friend of Zacarias Moussaoui—who pled guilty in United States District Court in Alexandria, Virginia to conspiring to kill Americans as part of the September 11, 2001 suicide hijackings.¹⁰² Jaffo’s online obituary from Azzam Publications UK related:

“Jihaad is far more besides the act of fighting on the front line. Masood al-Benin rahmatullah-alaihi demonstrated this... His intelligence and perseverance feesabeelillah were again evident when he mastered the operations of computers as applied to a Video editing studio... he spent countless hours struggling to learn computing with no help or assistance... Masood was assigned a role in the... camp which involved the use of his IT skills to setup and maintain a computer lab and to teach IT skills to the brothers.”¹⁰³

One of the unique aspects of Azzam Publications’ material on the conflict in the Caucasus was its focus on the use of suicide bombings—termed “martyrdom operations.” In addition to providing official fatwabs endorsing the use of suicide bombings, Azzam Publications also printed the biographies of individual “martyred” bombers in Chechnya. On June 10, 2000, Azzam’s Qoqaz.net website released the biography of “Sister Hawaa Barayev”, who became nicknamed “The Sword of the Hijab”:

“...To all those who waste their time with worldly exploits while Muslims are slaughtered in Chechnya and other parts of the world Take heed of the message issued by a young Muslim woman who wore the Hijab and was not even 20 years old, whose final words were: I know what I am doing; Paradise has a price and I hope this will be the price for Paradise. Moments later, sister Hawaa Barayev drove a car laden with explosives through the streets of Alkhan Kala and into a building that was used by the leadership of Russian Special Forces in Chechnya... After the dust settled, 27 Russian soldiers, many of them senior Special Forces officers, lay dead... Sister Hawaas sacrifice for the sake of Allah and the Muslims is a warning to the unbelievers not only in Chechnya, but across the world, that the people of Allah will no longer accept the tyranny of infidels... Hawaa Barayev taught the enemies of Allah that they will be held accountable and will be hunted down by the soldiers of Allah... Will those Muslims who are sitting in the comfort of their homes learn the lessons taught to the world by Hawaa Barayev; will you follow in her example of unquestioning faith and heroic selflessness?”¹⁰⁴

In fact, the Qoqaz.net website run by Azzam Publications in order to benefit the jihad in the Caucasus boasted an entire sub-section of information relating to “Martyrdom Operations” in Chechnya. The website documented in precise detail along with compelling photographic evidence such missions as “Operation Abdul Malik”:

“In Gudermes, Russian troops attempted to stop a heroic Mujahid from crashing his truck through the gates of the large Russian military base in the city. The base guards fired at the truck, however, by the Grace of Allah Most Glorious, the brother used his machine

¹⁰² Boulden, Jim. “France opened Moussaoui file in ‘94.” CNN. December 11, 2001.

¹⁰³ Azzam Publications. “Masood Al-Benin; Qoqaz.net Correspondent. Martyred 12 April 2000.” <http://www.azzam.com/html/storiesmasoodalbenin.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/storieshawaabarayev.htm>. June 10, 2000.

gun and killed nine enemy troops as he crashed through the gates. More Russian troops appeared and fired at the wheels of the truck and slowed it down, but nothing would stop Allah's plan — the brother stopped the truck, which was laden with 34 tonnes of explosives, between two massive buildings used by enemy troops at the base. The force of the ensuing explosion was tremendous and both buildings were destroyed. Mujahideen sources confirm that until this time, Russian emergency crews have recovered the corpses of 680 soldiers from the site. At least 1,000 others have been injured. On another note, eyewitnesses have reported seeing more than 30 Russian military Kamaz trucks on the road from Gudermes to Dagestan. The eyewitnesses confirm that the trucks were loaded with the corpses of Russian troops who were killed in Sunday's martyrdom operation that wiped out much of the Russian military's strength in Chechnya's second largest city."¹⁰⁵

The reaction was quick, and overwhelming. Azzam Publications began to publish letters from fans, including a note from one Lebanese Muslim who cheered, "I never thought I'd appreciate pictures of death as much as I do when I see those of the Russian soldiers that you post in your site."¹⁰⁶ Another supporter from Australia commented, "After watching the Russian Hell video through your site, I am strongly convinced that the Mujahideen brothers are able to conduct many more similar operations to those recorded in the video. The operations were very effective, and I am very proud of it."¹⁰⁷ Likewise, cooperating defendants from a jihadist network based in Northern Virginia have testified in United States federal court that watching the video "Russian Hell" from Azzam Publications encouraged them to seek training at mujahideen camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁸ A former member of the network, Yong Ki Kwon, testified under oath, "They (the videos) motivated us. It was like they gave us inspiration."¹⁰⁹

In November 2000, the Qoqaz.net website run by Azzam Publications posted a heartfelt thank-you note to its associates and affiliates around the world who had assisted in providing technical support for the Qoqaz.net site and establishing mirrored locations for the site on the Internet in other languages—including French, Italian, Turkish, Spanish, and Russian. According to the note, "it is the e-mails of support we have received from our brothers and sisters around the World that has kept us going and made this web-site so successful with the Will of Allah (SWT)... We would also like to say thank you to the following (not in any particular order)... To Sister Ptichka for working on the Russian web-site."¹¹⁰ It is my understanding that "Sister Ptichka" is associated with defendant Pirouz Sedaghaty.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon has provided me with a collection of eight e-mail messages which appear to have been issued as part of an online newlist titled "sheeshan" (transliterated Arabic for "Chechnya"). The "sheeshan" newlist offered subscribers "reports about the Chechen Mujaahideen and occasionally... other articles of interest."¹¹¹ Six of the eight messages furnished to me from the "sheeshan" distribution list offer material directly copied and pasted from the Azzam

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/photosmartyrops.htm>. July 17, 2000.

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/emailsjun00.htm>. July 2000.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/emailsjul00.htm>. August 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Russell, Betsy Z. "Prosecutors wrap up case against student." *Spokesman Review* (Spokane). May 25, 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Erdley, Debra. "Witness testifies against Al-Timimi." *Pittsburgh Tribune-Review*. April 10, 2005.

¹¹⁰ <http://www.qoqaz.net/html/articlesanniversary.htm>. November 21, 2000.

¹¹¹ Abdul-Qaadir Abdul-Khaaliq [abdqaadir@shabakah.com]. "E-Mail List." January 20, 2000.

Publications website Qoqaz.net. The titles of the messages include, "Frequently Asked Questions about the Jihad in Chechnya", "A Call to All Muslims", "Thirteen Mujahideen Annihilate Russian Convoy", "Four Foreign Mujahideen Attain Martyrdom", "Russian Forces Expand Terror Campaign Against Civilian Population", and "How can I Train Myself for Jihad." When Azzam Publications first published the final document, "How can I Train Myself for Jihad" in February 2000, it caused a significant stir in the online extremist community.¹¹² On July 19, 2000, "brother AM" from the United States wrote an e-mail to Azzam Publications expressing his admiration for their work: "Respected brothers, I have become addicted to your website. I don't even want to tell you how many times I check it each day in the hope of finding something new!" The writer added that he had "especially found" a certain handful of items "to be extremely useful and touching, and I would encourage all other Muslims - brothers and sisters, who are serious about Jihad, to read them and act accordingly"—including "How I Can Train Myself for Jihad."¹¹³ The guide opens with a quote from the Quran favored by Shaykh Abdullah Azzam: "And prepare against them all you can of power, including steeds of war to terrorise the enemies of Allah and others besides whom you may not know, but Allah does know." It proceeds to offer a litany of advice and guidance addressing the military training of homegrown terrorist cells, with an acknowledged intent for this knowledge to be used for illegal purposes in connection with violent jihad:

"Firearms training differs from country to country... In some countries of the World, especially the USA, firearms training is available to the general public. One should try to join a shooting club if possible and make regular visits to the firing range. There are many firearms courses available to the public in USA, ranging from one day to two weeks or more. These courses are good but expensive. Some of them are only meant for security personnel but generally they will teach anyone. It is also better to attend these courses in pairs or by yourself, no more. Do not make public announcements when going on such a course. Find one, book your place, go there, learn, come back home and keep it yourself. Whilst on the course, keep your opinions to yourself, do not argue or debate with anyone, do not preach about Islam and make Salah in secret. You are going there to train for Jihad, not call people to Islam. Useful courses to learn are sniping, general shooting and other rifle courses... In other countries, e.g. some states of USA, South Africa, it is perfectly legal for members of the public to own certain types of firearms. If you live in such a country, obtain an assault rifle legally, preferably AK-47 or variations, learn how to use it properly and go and practice in the areas allowed for such training... One can learn to operate many arms legally, so there is no need to spend years in prison for dealing in small, illegal firearms... leave the rest to when you actually go for Jihad."¹¹⁴

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon has also provided me with a final e-mail titled "What support?" from p@qf.org to soliman@albuthi.com dated January 22, 2000. This e-mail contains yet another excerpt copied straight from the Azzam Publications "Jihad in Chechnya" website Qoqaz.net:

"20 Nov 1999: Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Ibn-ul-Khattab

¹¹² <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/articlesjihadtrain.htm>. February 29, 2000.

¹¹³ <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/emailsjul00.htm>. July 23, 2000.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.azzam.com/qoqaz/html/articlesjihadtrain.htm>. February 29, 2000.

Question 6: Do you need any support? What support in particular do you need?

Answer 6: The Chechen Republic has been surrounded from all sides. However, the Russian Army is prepared to sell everything for a price. As for previous affairs of the Muslims, one would always find Islamic charities and organisations present. I am sorry to say that there is not a SINGLE Islamic charity or organisation active inside Chechnya at present. Only the Red Cross is present in the Chechen towns and cities. Therefore, we advise the Muslims and the Muslim countries to take a sincere stand with the Mujahideen in the land of the Caucasus."

V.) The American Islamic Group (AIG)

In 1993, two individuals from southern California, Mohammad Zaki and Kifah Jayyousi, established a haven of radical Muslim fundamentalist thought in Southern California. Their extremist ideals were channeled into the creation of three closely-linked entities: the American Islamic Group (AIG), American World-Wide Relief (AWW), and the Islamic Information Center of the Americas. Essentially, the three groups played separate but integral roles in a critical terrorist recruitment and support center for disciples of the Afghan jihad. AIG served as the political front, issuing regular communiqués and news reports. AWW (formerly known as "Save Bosnia Now") was the charitable arm, providing substantial financial support to Al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist groups in Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, and elsewhere. By networking with other extremists across North America and Europe, the AIG was able to expand its reach to the east coast of the United States (through Florida resident Adham Hassoun) and eventually to continents around the world.

Following the violent death of Mohammed Zaki in 1995 while fighting alongside the mujahideen in Chechnya, the responsibility of managing AIG was primarily assumed by Kifah Jayyousi. Jayyousi, a Palestinian-American engineer, authored the organization's press releases, including their infamous "Islam Reports." In February 1994, Jayyousi published an open e-mail concerning the details of a planned resurgent Muslim empire. He explained, "I am a Muslim citizen of the great upcoming Islamic State." Jayyousi referred to those opposed to this new Islamic state as "bloodsuckers... who are enslaving Muslims in Asia and Africa and around the World, they are the ones who are fueling the war using their agents." He urged other Muslims to "be an achiever and help form it... Help rid the land of [the infidels] and [the hypocrites]." More specifically, Jayyousi wrote, "as to [Egyptian President Hosni] Mubarak, may Allah curse him, his departure or assassination, [God willing], will be a major Fath or victory to strengthen Islam." Moreover, although Egypt and other secular Middle Eastern regimes were deemed to be troublesome adversaries by Jayyousi, he made a point to "reiterate that the west is Islam's enemy No.1."¹¹⁵

The official newsletter of the AIG—the so-called "Islam Report"—was arguably one of the most radical English-language jihadist propaganda publications in recent history, with impeccable sources and credentials. The April/May 1994 print edition of AIG's "Islam Report" featured a particularly noteworthy endorsement from "Mujahideen Camps in Kabul, Afghanistan": "Islam Report is a powerful voice of truth, please send it

¹¹⁵ Imran Anwar (imran@panix.com). "Attacks on Pakistanis & B. Bhutto Fwd: Re: Islam Report (News & Analysis." Newsgroups: soc.culture.pakistan. February 11, 1994.

regularly, our brothers read every word of it as it keeps us informed.”¹¹⁶ On many of the Islam Reports between 1994 and 1995, while legally disclaiming connections to any actual guerilla outfits, Kifah Jayyousi wrote that, nevertheless, “we would be proud to identify with GIA and other mujahideen.”¹¹⁷ AIG published numerous English translations of communiqués through the “Islam Report” originally authored by “Abu Al-Ma`ali,” the Algerian leader of the foreign mujahideen brigade fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹⁸ Likewise, AIG issued a flurry of special-edition “Islam Reports” to republish GIA communiqués concerning the December 1994 hijacking of an Air France commercial airliner by a GIA suicide team.

Documents seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show at least a handful of personal visits by AIG co-founder Kifah Jayyousi to the Boston metropolitan area between 1996 and 1998.¹¹⁹ One such document purports to be a letter from Samir al-Monla (a.k.a. Abu Waleed): “I would like to ask for your participation and assistance to help our brother KIFAH JAYYOUSI brings to your Masjid the latest video tape from CHECHNYA showing how Grozny was recaptured by Muslims and how the CHECHENS are struggling to implement the Islamic rule in their land by help of Allah (S.W.T). It will be a fund raising event. For the Donations we have our direct contact to CHECHNYA.”¹²⁰ The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Oregon has provided me with a copy of a video recording featuring propaganda footage from the first Russo-Chechen war (1994-1996), including former Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev and indigenous Chechen resistance fighters. The video is marked with the logo of the American Islamic Group (AIG). It appears to be similar—or the same—as the AIG fundraising video discussed in the letter from Samir al-Monla that was used to solicit donations for the mujahideen in Chechnya.

¹¹⁶ “Editorials.” Islam Report. Vol 1; Issue 7. April/May 1994. American Islamic Group (AIG). Page 2.

¹¹⁷ American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electriciti.com). “Islam Report (Air France Real Story Part II).” Newsgroups: soc.religion.islam. January 2, 1995.

¹¹⁸ American Islamic Group (islam@powergrid.electriciti.com). “Islam Report(Jihad in Europe! Now A Muslim Brigade!)” Newsgroups: alt.current-events.bosnia. September 23, 1995.

¹¹⁹ Exhibit CICR 07218. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

¹²⁰ Exhibit CICR08010. U.S. v. Muhamed Mubayyid, Emadeddin Muntasser, and Samir Al-Monla. Criminal Action No. 05-40026-FDS. United States District Court; District of Massachusetts.

Sentencing Exhibit 3

Letter dated March 25, 2009
from U.S. Attorney's Office
to Steven Wax



U.S. Department of Justice

Karin J. Immergut

United States Attorney

District of Oregon

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March 25, 2009

RECEIVED MAR 2 6 2009

Steven T. Wax
Federal Public Defender
101 SW Main Street, Suite 1700
Portland, OR 97204

Re: United States v. Sedaghaty
CR 05-60008-HO

Dear Mr. Wax:

Pursuant to Judge Hogan's orders of March 18, 2009, filed on March 20, 2009 (Docket # 160), this letter will inform you of the following unclassified summary of certain classified documents responsive to your discovery requests:

The U.S. Government obtained information that Sami 'Abd Al 'Aziz Al-Sanad worked during 2000 and 2001 for the Al-Haramain organization and was responsible for providing currency supplied by Al-Haramain, including the currency obtained by codefendant Soliman Al-Buthe from Al-Haramain USA, to a representative of Muhammad Al-Sayf, aka Abu 'Umar, to be smuggled into Chechnya. Al-Sanad has claimed that the monies he provided to Al-Sayf's representative were destined for needy Chechen families.

Very truly yours,

KARIN J. IMMERGUT

United States Attorney

CHARLES F. GORDER, JR.

Assistant United States Attorney

Anti-Terrorism Coordinator

District of Oregon

cc: Lawrence Matasar, Esq.
AUSA Chris Cardani